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OLD QUESTIONS-WALKER'S THEORY OF THE
COMMON LAW.
There is something about an old question that is very attractive
to the quiet and speculative mind of a student. There is no hurry,
no bustle about it. The crowd cares nothing for it-you feel that
you can take it-that you can carefully and leisurely enjoy it.
There is no glaring sunshine about it; but around it is that
gray-half light that contemplation loves. It is of the olden
time, and there is something of mystery and of veneration about
it-something of the ruin and the ivy; and your pursuit of it is
amidst the shadows of "things that were." It has been a subject
of investigation to the great maaterg, and you feel your inquiry as
an association with them. And then to ind[ out a now and satisfactory solution of it !-&a solution so simple and plain,-you wonder
that it was not always known-it makes you feel t there is yet
more room. Old law questions particularly commend themselves;
for the study of them begets a love of the profe66ion-not a love for
its mere honors and profits, but a love for it as the science of
humanity, as a science which calls into vigorous action the highest
and best faculties of the mind. They commend themselves too, as
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the very entrances into the science, which stretches itself out into
a vast-a boundless extent, with divisions and sub-divisions interminable. He who finds other entrance often knows not which way
to turn; and turning, finds himself involved in depressing and inextricable difficulties. No where else can a clue be found that will
lead to the certain and satisfactory determination of many a new
and untried question.
How q" any one hope to learn the tendency of a system; the
philosophy of it; its influence upon the character and destiny of
those who live under it, if he study not the system as it was, as
nell ais the system as itJs?
In order to get at the philosophy of a system, it is necessary to
study it in detail, to go from point to point, and after one has thus
gone over the whole ground, then to lift up his eyes and take a survey of it as a whole. Now, this survey is .what Mr. Walker has
attempted in his "Theory of the Common Law"-a book that
deserves to be carefully read by every member of the profession,
for the object is worthy of all praise; and even if the conclusion be
incorrect, yet it )nay suggest and lead to a more successful effort.
And even if the law, or the reason of it, be sometimes mistaken,
yet the errots will encourage, whilst the learning will stimulate us
to renewed exertion. It is a book that seems to be to the Common
Law, what De Quincey's ' 1Cxsars" is to the History of Imperial
Rome. )But we do not propose to offer a criticism upon it, as a
work--.we-propose only toL notice two or three "Old questions,"
abotttwhich we differ 'ith tlie learned author.
,Take this '-one-1"Why does the law inexorably demand that the
remainders shall vest 4t the-very instant of the determination of
the precding estate," p. 21.
Mr. W41kea wwers-'By the Common Law, livery of seizin
was necessav
give the title to a freehold interest in land. When,
therefore, 'tha nant for life took livery of seizin, the remainderman acquired an inc.oate right to the remainder. This right vested
in the remainder-mau as soon as the particular estate commenced,
but did not authorize him to enter into the possession of the land,
,even at the death of the tenant for life, without the consent of the
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lord. Sciendztm est feudum sine investiturq nullo mode constitui
posse. Now, if the tenant for ife forfeited his estate--and only by
forfeiture could he lose it-it necessarily reverted to the lord; because the remainder-man, not having livery of seizin, could not
enter to exclude the lord, and livery could not be granted him, as
remainder-man, under the original agreement, for the tenant for
life was not dead. The resumption of the land by the lord was not
the acquisition of a new estate, but his restoration to his original
estate, for the tenure or contract of holding was that the lord might
re-enter for breach of -any condition; being restored to his old
estate, the remainder, necessarily, no longer existed., To prevent,
therefore, the failure of the remainder, consequent upon a reverter
to the lord of his old estate, the tenancyfor life must,in every case,
continue until the moment when, by the law of the contract, the
remainder-man is entitled to demand livery of seizing"
p. 23, 24.
Now, we deny that consent of the lord or direct investiture was
necessary to the entry of him in the remainderi after the expiration of the particular estate. The particular estate and the remain-:
der constituted but one freehold quoad this purpose; and the livery
to the particular tenant enured, therefore, to the remainder-man as
fully as if it had been made directly to him. It was not, therefore,
feudum sine invedtitura. A second livery would, indeed, have
been nugatory, for quod 8emel meum est ampliu meum esse non
potest.
It is true that a contingent remainder may be defeated by the
entry of the grantor for breach of condition in law, but a vested
remainder cannot be destroyed in that way. The vested remainderman and not the grantor, has the right of entry in such case.
There does not seem to be the slightest ground for saying, that a
co-obligation exists between tenant for life and remainder-man, that
tenant for life will not do any act amounting toa forfeiture. That
is the reason, however, which Mr. Walker gives for saying, that
the rule is founded upon the plainest principle of justice. It is
true there was such an obligation, but it rested upon the particular tenant alone. It certainly cannot be said, that a contingent
remainder-man who was not in esse, or who was not ascertained
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was a, party "1in fact and in law" with the tenant of the particular
estate, in his contract with the grantor. No, the destructibility of
each remainder by entry, for breach of 'condition in law, has a different cause. And as to the vested remainder, we have already
said, that a vested remainder-man had the right of entry for breach
of condition in law; and therefore he was an obligee rather than
an obligor.
In order to get a clear idea of the matter, let us separate it into
four questions : 1. Why is a limitation of a freehold estate, in lands,
to commence defuturo generally-void at the common law? 2. Why
is a limitation not a remainder, if it be not limited to take effect
immediately upon the determination of a preceding estate? 3. Why
must a remainder be created at the same time with the particular
estate preceding it? 4. Why must a remainder vest in interest, at
least, eo instantithat the estate supporting it determines?
First. The reason, why a freehold estate, in land, cannot generally be limited at the common law to commence de futuro, is that
livery of seizin is necessary to pass a freehold, and it is a ceremony
in prwsenti, the operation of which cannot expect. The reason
why a limitation'to take effect a day or a moment after the determination of a preceding estate is void as a limitation, is different
from the reason why such a limitation is not a remainder.
Second. The answer to the second question is suggested by asking another. Why is not the interest of a grantor, which is to take
effect in possession after the expiration of a partial estate, a remainder? The common law, like every other system, has elementary
ideas; and it is certainly one of them, that a remainder is a limitation which is to take effect immediately upon the determination
of a preceding estate.
Third. We may quote a reply to the third question. " It cannot
be created previous to the creation of one or more particular
estates; for though an estate may well be created out of another
estate, without the creation of a preceding estate, yet it cannot,
with propriety, be called a remainder, which signifies a remnant or
residuary part. Besides, if such an estate were of freehold and in
lands, it would, as we have seen, be necessary by the common law,
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to make livery of seizin, and then, instead of a remainder, it would
be an estate in possession. Nor can a remainder be created subsequent to the creatioi of one or more particular estates ; for though
an estate may well be conveyed subsequently, yet such an estate
would be but the part, or the whole of a reversion. As' a remainder, then, cannot be created either previously or subsequently, it
.must, therefore, be created at the same time, in fact or in law, with
one or more particular estates preceding it."'
Fourth. We come now to inquire, why it isthat a remainder
must vest in interest, at least, eo instanti that the estate supporting it determines.
If the particular estate be destroyed or its limitation regularly
expire before the remainder becomes vested, then another estate,
either rightful or wrongful, comes in esse, and the existence of such
rightful or wrongful estate is inconsistent with the existence of the
limitation over as a remainder. If it were allowed to exist, it would
be as a springing interest ; but it could not take effect as a springing interest, for, if of freehold in lands, it would be in violation of
the rule requiring livery of seizin to pass such a freehold, and whatever its character, it would be inconsistent with the rule, that whenever a limitation is good, as a remainder, in its inception, it shall
never take effect otherwise than as a remainder. But let us take
another view of the matter.
It is said that a limitation cannot, strictly speaking, be a remainder, unless it be of freehold; but if this be not so, it is nevertheless
true, that freehold remainders in lands were first created, and that
the rules governing remainders were first Ordered and applied to
them. We must look, therefore, to them for the reasons of the
rules which govern remainders generally.
Livery of seizin was necessary to pass a freehold in land, and yet
livery could not expect. How, then, consistently with these principles, could a freehold remainder be allowed? It could not have
been, but for the principle that the particular estate and the remainder were but pirts of the same estate. Unity, therefore, was the
1 Keyes on Remainders, 19, 20.
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principle upon which the livery to him, in prcesenti, enured to him
in remainder. Departure from this principle of unity would have
been an abrogation of the rule requiring livery. It was necessary,
then, that the remainder should vest, at least eo inatanti, the particular estate determined or was destroyed; because by the destruction of the unity, the limitation over would become a separate and
distinct freehold to commence de futuro, and therefore void, not.
as a remainder, but also as a limitation.
Mr. Walker seems to have fallen into error, in regard to fees conditional. The judges did not determine that, upon the birth of
issue, the limitation to the heirs of the body was executed in the
donee. 1 The limitation to the heirs of the body was executed in
such tenant in fee immediately. There was no waiting for the
birth of issue. Such a tenant had no larger estate after issue born,
than he had before. He acquired a right of alienation by such
birth, which was transmissible from heir to heir, until it was exercised, or inheritable issue became extinct. If such tenant aliened
before issue, and then had'issue, and subsequently "died without
issue," the lord might enter; but if he aliened after issue, and then
"died without issue," the lord could not enter-and this is the
diversity. But why was it held that such tenant could alien after
the birth of inheritable issue, and thus defeat the lord-reverter ?
That he had as good right to alien a conditional fee as a tenant in
fee simple had to alien in fee simple, is clear enough. Neither had
such right at first, and so when it is said that the statute de donis
restored the common law, it must not be understood th .it restored
what was peculiar to fees conditional. But that the alienation of
the tenant in fee conditional, after the birth of inheritable issue
should have been allowed to defeat the lord's reverter, must be conceded to have been a judicial errorin favor of alienation. For, if
there had been anything in the reason, that a condition once performed is gone forever, then such tenant would have become tenant
in fee simple upon the birth of inheritable issue, and that was not
true; for, as we have already said, if he died afterwards without

1 See Theory Common Law, chap. 9.
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aliening and without issue, the land reverted. The rule in Shelley's
case has no peculiar application here, and it does not, as Mr.
Walker insists, render any assistance in the explanation of this
matteri
But we have never met with a legal proposition that struck us
with greater surprise than the assertion, that when an estate was
given to A and his heirs, that his heir originally took by purchase. It is true that the ancestor could not alien, but that has
nothing to do with the distinction between purchase and descent.
Purchase was a taking directly, descent was a taking through an
ancestor. The ancestor claimed from the lord, but he claimed
directly, and therefore by purchase. The heir claimed from the
lord, but he claimed throughthe ancestor, and therefore by descent.
An estate of inheritance originally was but a succession of life
estates without impeachment of waste, to which the right of aliening in fee was not incident-and so now it is but a succession of
life estates without impeachment of -waste, to which the- right -of
aliening in fee is incident. And here we may add a questionWas it ever suspected, whilst estates tail were held to be indestructible, as they, were before Ta-ltarum's case, that the heir of the
body took by purchase? But if the heir was entitled to take by
purchase, at the common law as it originally was, then swat certainly was the heir of the body so entitled, under the statute de
donis, since that statute was but a restoration pro lanto of the common law.
In rd%
to the rule in Shellefs 6se, Mr. Walker says, "INeither the great argument of Justice'lackstone, in Perrin and Blake,
nor the admirable criticism of Mr. Fearne on that case, and the rule
itself, enlighten us as to its origin. It is too important, however,
not to receive careful investigation." 2 Without following our
learned author, however, we may re-assert that there seem to
1" two rules included in the discussions.. Of the rule of Shelley's
case, the first rule applies to cases in which the gift is to the heirs
of the grantor. The second, which is properly the celebrated rule
in Shelley's case, applies to cases in which the heirs are not the
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